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SAFE Charlotte Recommendations and Next Steps Update

In October 2020 Charlotte City Council adopted the SAFE Charlotte initiative. The foundation of this holistic work sought to reimagine public safety while also reevaluating systemic issues affecting the community, including unemployment, housing, transportation, and workforce development.

Reimagining policing is an on-going effort to critically analyze and evaluate how to best promote safety in our community, recognizing the job of maintaining a safe Charlotte extends beyond the work of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department. To facilitate a transition toward reimagining policing in Charlotte, six recommendations were developed to help meet the needs of creating a safer community for everyone. Over the last 11 months the city has worked with external consultants, community members, community partners, and other stakeholders to advance next steps within the SAFE Charlotte recommendations.

SAFE Charlotte Recommendations

1. Provide $1 million from the city’s FY 2021 budget to help Charlotte-based non-profits address violence in the community.
2. Work with an external partner to develop a comprehensive recommendation to convert low-risk sworn duties to nonuniform units.
3. Work with an external partner to provide an independent analysis of areas such as police-civilian contact, calls for service, and police responses.
4. Expand the Community Policing Crisis Response Team and develop a nonsworn officer responder model for mental health and homeless calls.
5. Engage a university or independent organization to evaluate selected youth programs on an annual basis.
6. Enhance recruitment efforts and develop a program to provide additional residency incentives to officers living in priority areas, including a down payment incentive.

Based on extensive analysis and collaboration across external and community partners throughout the last year, the city is creating a framework to address these emphasized needs and concerns. Detailed results from these action items can be found in a series of reports developed by consultants, in partnership with the city. Summaries of these reports and their significant findings are highlighted in the pages below.
**Recommendation 1**

*Recommendation 1*

Provide $1 million from the city’s FY 2021 budget to help Charlotte-based nonprofits address violence in the community.

In April 2021, the city, in partnership with United Way of Central Carolinas, awarded 17 local Charlotte organizations grants of $50,000 to address violence in our community. Organizations were awarded funds to support one of the following programmatic areas:

- Youth Services (ages 13-19)
- Employment Training
- Services for children under 13 and their caregivers
- Supportive services for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault

In addition to receiving funds to expand or implement important community-based programs, these organizations will also receive extensive capacity building resources throughout their grant year through a partnership with United Way and B.Y.E., a local consulting firm. Improving the capacity of local organizations to implement effective programs is a critical component to building and sustaining safe communities. The FY 2022 budget included $1 million to continue the SAFE Charlotte grant program.

**Recommendation 2 and 4**

*Recommendation 2*

Work with an external partner to develop a comprehensive recommendation to convert low-risk sworn duties to nonuniform units.

*Recommendation 4*

Expand the Community Policing Crisis Response Team and develop a nonsworn officer responder model for mental health and homeless calls.

In March 2021 RAND Corporation began research and analysis for tasks associated with Recommendations 2 and 4. This research was carried out within the Justice Policy Program in the RAND Social and Economic Well-Being Division.

Major tasks included an analysis of calls for service data, with a focus on low-risk, low-priority calls for service (Recommendation 2) and calls related to mental health crises, substance abuse, and homelessness (Recommendation 4) from 2015-2020. For each of these call types, RAND examined the quantity, type, time, and location variation of calls that can be responded to by:

1. Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s Community Policing Crisis Response Team;
2. A unit of civilian mental health clinicians, social workers, and/or EMTs; and/or
3. A unit of civilian community safety technicians.

RAND worked with Amplify Consulting, a local Charlotte firm, who partnered with the city to engage with community stakeholders including residents, law enforcement, local mental healthcare providers, and others to gather feedback and reactions to possible implementation strategies for Recommendations 2 and 4. Supplemental to this work, RAND was tasked with developing an asset mapping tool of resources
and partners within Charlotte, both internal and external to the city, that have capacity to respond to or assist with mental health and substance abuse calls. This involved 35 interviews with city and county public safety departments, local mental healthcare providers, and other community partners. Finally, RAND reviewed academic literature and best practices from existing crisis and low-risk response models across the country to provide a nationwide context for their findings.

These findings provided a framework for options presented to the city for implementing civilian response models for:

1. Other low-risk, low-priority calls for service; and
2. Mental health, substance abuse, and homelessness calls for service.

In anticipation of service expansions, the city included $739,000 in the FY 2022 budget to double the number of Community Policing Crisis Response Teams, the city’s current co-responder model, from six to 12 teams and $1.2 million to launch a pilot program in which civilians respond to mental health calls for service.

**Key Findings**

**Recommendation 2 – Low-Risk Civilian Response**

- Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD) uses a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system to receive, route, and dispatch officers to 911 calls. Dispatchers give each call a priority ranking from zero to nine, with priority zero calls being the most urgent (i.e., an officer is in immediate danger), priority five calls being the least urgent (i.e., there is no immediacy or danger associated with the reason for the call), and priorities six through nine reserved for administrative or animal control concerns. These priority five calls are referred to as “routine priority” and were the subject of the majority of RAND’s analysis of low-risk calls.

- In the absence of officer injury data, RAND defined low-risk calls as those for which:
  - On-scene priority did not change during the course of their service; and
  - Calls did not require more than a single unit on scene.
    - By these metrics, the lowest risk calls were illegal parking, found property, personal property inquiries, and road blockages.

- The most frequent routine priority call types were noise complaints, traffic accidents and infractions, and larceny from vehicles (RAND, pp. 35-36)
  - These call types made up approximately 26 percent of routine priority calls from 2015 to 2020.

- In Neighborhood Statistical Area 3 (Providence and Central Divisions; Dilworth neighborhood) routine priority calls accounted for approximately 19% of all calls (RAND, p. 41).

- The lowest share of these calls occurred in the early morning and late evening, and the highest share occurred between 7am and 7pm. Between 11am and 2pm, routine priority calls account for about 20 percent of all calls. (RAND, p. 37).
The left panel shows the number of routine priorities calls in each neighborhood. The right panel shows the proportion of all calls from that neighborhood that were of a routine priority (minimum 500 calls).

- Both the number and the proportion of routine priority calls remained relatively constant across days of the week and months of the year. (RAND, pp. 38-39).

- The City of Fort Worth, Texas recently launched a limited hours non-sworn response team for low-risk, low-priority calls in 2021 (RAND, p. 113).
  - Due to the fact that civilian response models are new and still developing, there is limited research regarding their efficacy.

- There is no empirical evidence for the number of two-person teams that should be deployed (RAND, p. 107).

- During the interview segment of analysis, RAND heard mixed support for a civilian response approach for low-risk calls. Community members stated that there were potentially low-risk situations where they would like to have an officer respond for various reasons. However, many also stated that a uniform has the potential to be upsetting for many community members (RAND, pp. 55-56).

**Recommendation 4 – Civilian Response for Mental Health**

- RAND analyzed all calls from 2015 to 2020 and identified those that potentially related to mental health, substance abuse, or homelessness. In making this determination, RAND reviewed the call type and priority recorded in CMPD’s CAD system, as well as whether the Crisis Response Team or Crisis Intervention Team were dispatched. RAND excluded calls that were potentially dangerous.
• A total of 261,439 calls (seven percent of all calls from 2015-2020) were potentially related to mental health, substance abuse, and homelessness (these are referred to as “flagged” calls) (RAND, p. 43).
  o Calls flagged as potentially related to mental health were overwhelmingly identified as welfare checks (120,374 calls or 73.6 percent). Calls flagged for substance abuse were most often overdoses (6,893 calls or 54.1 percent) (RAND, p. 44).
  o Flagged calls reach their peak, both in terms of call volume and share of all calls, in the middle of the day (RAND, p. 45).
  o Flagged calls were most likely to occur in Neighborhood Statistical Area 340 (Central Division; 6,169 flagged calls), where more than 13 percent of all calls in the neighborhood were flagged as potentially relating to mental health, substance abuse, or homelessness (RAND, p. 49).
  o Flagged calls were least likely to be received on weekends and most likely to be received on Mondays (RAND, p. 46).
  o Flagged calls tended to be more frequent during warm weather months (RAND, p. 47).

Flagged Calls by Neighborhood (RAND, p.49; Figure 2.8)

The left panel shows the number of flagged calls in each neighborhood. The right panel shows the proportion of all calls from that neighborhood that were flagged (minimum 500 calls).

• The qualitative data supports that the success of program implementation will increase with hiring people representative of the community or subcontracting to a community organization (RAND, p. 106).
• The city lacks a continuum of care for behavioral health, or a consistent system to identify individuals in crisis throughout the community (RAND, p. 51).

• Analysis suggested CMPD’s current call volume can support up to five civilian EMT/clinician teams as a pilot (RAND, p. 128).

• In order to allow for ease of evaluation, a potential pilot of a civilian response to mental health calls should not be physically co-located with a potential pilot of a non-specialized civilian response for low-risk calls (RAND, p. 127).

• CMPD can mitigate potential safety issues and streamline data collection by dispatching any potential mental health response units through the same dispatch and CAD system used for all other calls for service (RAND, p. 128).

• Cost estimates for pilot programs range from $850,000 to $1.85M for one year of service. (RAND, p. 129).

Recommendations

Recommendation 2 – Low-Risk Civilian Response

• CMPD is the agency best suited to manage and house a civilian response to low-risk calls for service.

• Consider deploying two-person non-specialized teams in areas that have high concentration of low priority calls for service starting with one two-person team per Neighborhood Statistical Area.

  o Neighborhood Statistical Area 3 (Providence/Central Division; Dilworth Neighborhood) is best suited given the volume of low-risk calls in this area.

• Convene a Community Advisory Council to be involved in implementation of the pilot.

• Enhance connection between IACMS data for officer injuries to CAD calls to better track officer injuries.

• Pilot programs for an alternative mental health response and general non-specialized response for low-risk calls should be implemented in separate geographies so performance for these options can be more easily monitored.

Recommendation 4 - Civilian Response for Mental Health

• Begin with a pilot program of two-person teams consisting of a mental health clinician and an EMT. These teams should:

  o Be deployed via the existing 911 dispatch system;

  o Initially operate from approximately 2pm – 10 pm; and
- Be deployed within a limited geography with a high density of flagged calls. This will improve the city’s ability to evaluate outcomes.
  - Potential locations: Providence, Central, and North Tryon Divisions (RAND, pp. 108-109)

- An analysis of resources internal and external to the city shows that the pilot program would best be suited within CMPD. This is because CMPD:
  - Has the existing infrastructure and expertise to share the resources and information (such as CAD data) needed to implement the pilot;
  - Oversees Charlotte’s 911 dispatch system;
  - Has existing connections with the stakeholders who will need to be involved with the pilot, as well as the ability to coordinate with this group of stakeholders; and
  - Is able to provide an emergency safety response to calls if needed.

- Convene a Community Advisory Council consisting of organizations from across the continuum of care including other emergency response organizations and mental health providers. This group should oversee implementation of the pilot.

- Review/revise CMPD procedures to account for the needs of this pilot.

**Next Steps**

- Move forward with development of civilian mental health response pilot.
  - Refine analysis to develop a road map to define eligible call types, dispatch processes, and other operational considerations.

- Convene a Mental Health Response Advisory Group (Community Advisory Council) to guide the implementation of the mental health response pilot.
  - The advisory group will include a variety of stakeholders from different disciplines including the Charlotte Fire Department, CMPD, Mecklenburg County, the Mecklenburg Emergency Medical Services Agency, and non-profit providers.

- Continue to monitor best practices for expanding the use of civilians in police responses, particularly around low-risk calls for service.
Recommendation 3

Work with an external partner to provide an independent analysis of areas such as police-civilian contact, calls for service, and responses.

RAND also provided analysis and recommendations for SAFE Charlotte Recommendation 3. There are two major tasks associated with this recommendation: an analysis of racial disparity in all officer-civilian contacts and an analysis of racial disparity among individual officers’ actions. The data used in these analyses are primarily collected by CMPD to document criminal activity, traffic violations, and Internal Affairs complaints within the department. It should be noted that the data used in this analysis was not historically captured or organized in a way to conduct racial disparity analysis, and there are several opportunities for improvement in data collection. In spite of existing limitations with connections between data sets, the available information was analyzed to identify areas warranting additional review and investigation. RAND used a variety of statistical methods to analyze data for this purpose and their findings warrant further investigation to understand the root causes of the various disparities they identified and apply appropriate solutions to correct these disparities.

Key Findings

Officer-Civilian Contacts

RAND analyzed several CMPD data sources to estimate the extent to which racial/ethnic disparity is evident in police interactions. RAND leveraged traffic stop data, arrest data, and complaint data from 2015-2020, as well as data related to neighborhood characteristics (income, violent crime rate, etc.) in these analyses. It is important to note that RAND’s analyses differentiate racial disparity from racial bias. Racial disparity is defined as measurable differences in outcomes associated with a racial/ethnic group compared to a reference group; racial bias refers to beliefs, attitudes, or practices and is difficult to identify using statistical data or methodologies. The information below provides a summary of the racial disparity tests RAND conducted and the results of these tests. RAND was unable to identify specific policies or strategies that may be linked to racial disparities in officer-civilian contacts.

Decision to Use Force in Traffic Stops

- In accordance with state law, CMPD collects and reports statistics on traffic stops conducted by the department. Following every traffic stop, officers must complete a form designed by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. This form includes the yes/no question, “Did officer(s) engage in the use of force against the driver and/or passenger [of the stopped vehicle]?” CMPD officers complete this form electronically using the CMPD Intranet Data Collection/Stop Data system. RAND analyzed responses to this question to determine whether racial disparity exists in CMPD’s decision to use force during traffic stops.

  - RAND examined 538,719 traffic stop reports collected over the past six years and identified 250 instances in which officers indicated force was used at a traffic stop. This represents less than 0.05 percent of all stops conducted during this period (RAND, pp. 83-84).


According to the use of force indicator, RAND found Black drivers were 1.9 times more likely than white drivers to experience use of force during a traffic stop (RAND, p. 83).

Severity of Force - Rates of force (lethal and less lethal) are higher for Asian, Black, and Hispanic individuals relative to white individuals, but the precision of these estimates and rates are low due to a limited sample size (~3,000 instances of force) (RAND, pp. 86-88; Table 3.25).

Following the RAND findings, CMPD initiated a supplemental and methodical examination of other data collected during the 250 traffic stops in which a use of force was indicated.

In addition to the traffic stop report, officers are required to notify their supervisor of any use of force, who then initiates a use of force investigative packet in CMPD’s Internal Affairs Case Management System (IACMS).
• Of the 250 traffic stops for which a use of force was recorded:
  o CMPD found that 94 traffic stops did not indicate an arrest was made and did not have a corresponding IACMS report on file within Internal Affairs. CMPD audited all available body and dashboard camera footage from these 94 stops and found no evidence that force was used, meaning officers likely made a mistake when completing the traffic stop report.
  o CMPD found at least eight examples where officers entered a 'Yes' response in the “use of force” field for traffic stops and indicated an arrest was made. After further review, these events either involved an occurrence of a non-force subject (i.e., an instance in which a subject is injured by something other than force from an officer) or where the officer who entered the traffic stop form was assisting another agency (e.g., NC State Highway Patrol) with a traffic stop that involved an arrest and use of force by the other agency’s officer.

**Supplemental Analysis for Decision to use force:**

• Given the small sample size used in RAND’s use of force analysis above, coupled with the potential for officer error in traffic stop reports, RAND made a decision to perform a supplemental analysis of uses of force during arrests made by CMPD over the past six years.

• RAND identified 1,202 arrests during which force was used and found inconclusive evidence for racial disparity in officers’ use of force for Black arrestees, as well as some evidence that Hispanic arrestees are less likely than non-Hispanic arrestees to receive force (RAND, pp. 85-86).

• Taken together, the use of force and supplemental analysis findings warrant continued investigation by CMPD. RAND’s analysis exposed flaws in the use of force indicator present on traffic stop reports which need to be addressed. For instance, uses of force indicated on the report should be accompanied by contextual and narrative data that describe the events preceding the force.

**Rates of Pedestrian and Vehicle Stops by Racial/Ethnic Group**

RAND provided findings for *Rates of Pedestrian and Vehicle Stops by Racial/Ethnic Groups* in two different designs.

1. The stops per 100,000 citizens in the racial/ethnic group in Charlotte as a whole; and

2. The stops per 100 citizens in the racial/ethnic group in the neighborhood where the stop took place.
With design number two, an important factor to consider is that not all neighborhoods contain residents of each of the racial/ethnic groups RAND analyzed, therefore some neighborhoods were excluded from RAND’s model of certain racial/ethnic groups. For each analysis, RAND fit an unadjusted model which does not control for neighborhood characteristics, as well as an adjusted model, which does. Because there are vastly more vehicle stops than pedestrian stops, the analysis of vehicle stops is essentially identical to the analysis of all stops (vehicle and pedestrian), and a focus on vehicle stops is highlighted below (RAND, pp. 72-76). The following table provides a summary of the most common reasons for stops across all races/ethnicities for vehicle stops.

### Significant Take-Aways - Rates of Pedestrian and Vehicle Stops by Racial/Ethnic Group

When reviewing from the perspective of 100,000 citizens in the racial/ethnic group in Charlotte as a whole relative to white people:

- The likelihood a Black person is stopped is almost three times the likelihood a white person is stopped, and the likelihood a Hispanic person is stopped is almost one and a-half times the likelihood a white person is stopped (RAND, p. 73).

- The rate at which Asian individuals are stopped is lower than the rate at which white individuals are stopped (RAND, p. 73).

- These differences could not be explained by neighborhood characteristics (RAND, p. 73).
When reviewing from the perspective of stops per 100 citizens in the racial/ethnic group in the neighborhood where the stop took place relative to white people:

- When not accounting for neighborhood characteristics, Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely to be stopped than white individuals (RAND, p. 74).

- When accounting for neighborhood characteristics (e.g., income, crime, nuisance calls etc.), Black individuals are still more than two times as likely to be stopped than white individuals (RAND, p. 73).
  - (i.e., higher stop rate is not explained by the neighborhood characteristics where stop took place).

- When accounting for neighborhood characteristics, the likelihood a Hispanic person is stopped is similar to the likelihood a white person is stopped (RAND, p. 73).

**Rates of Pedestrian and Vehicle Stops by Racial/Ethnic Group – Veil of Darkness Test**

Previous results showed there was racial disparity in the frequency with which certain groups were stopped. An additional layer of analysis was used to further evaluate a potential cause of this disparity. This analysis, called “veil of darkness”, relies on daylight savings time changes to compare differences in the decision to stop individuals before and after the daylight savings time shift in order to determine if conditions of low visibility or high visibility lead to different outcomes in policing. In short, the benchmarking technique was used to detect statistical evidence of bias for both pedestrian and traffic stops.

**Significant Take-Aways - Veil of Darkness Test**

- Results from “Veil of Darkness” vehicle stop data can be found in Table 3.9 of RAND’s report (RAND, p. 76).

- No individual identity group was significantly more likely to be stopped in high visibility (daytime) conditions versus low visibility (nighttime) conditions, therefore the analysis did not find any evidence that disparity in stop rates is due to department-wide racial profiling or bias (RAND, p. 76).
Proportion of Citizen Complaints in Communities
RAND examined how complaint volume was related to the volume of vehicle and pedestrian stops in the neighborhood.

- For every additional 500 stops in a neighborhood, the number of complaints was estimated to increase by about 16 percent. (RAND, p. 89)

- These rates were virtually unchanged when adjusting for neighborhood characteristics.

Racial Profiling Complaints in Communities
The City of Charlotte provided clear direction on the importance of examining potential indicators of racial profiling by CMPD officers within the community. RAND analyzed CMPD’s complaint data, examined the CMPD Rule(s) of Conduct that were potentially violated in each complaint, and found 29 instances out of 1,571 complaints potentially referring to racial/ethnic profiling. RAND determined that this was not an adequate sample size to analyze the relationship between the number of police stops in the community and the number of racial profiling complaints (RAND, p. 89).
Yield Rates of Contraband

- RAND analyzed officer requests to search stopped individuals, alongside the rate at which searches yielded contraband, to determine whether racial disparity exists in CMPD’s policing strategy for illegal substances or materials.

- Ideally, officers gather information and only request to search individuals when this information suggests they may have contraband. If officers rely on sufficient information to support their searches, then yield rates of contraband should be higher. If officers rely on insufficient information, then yield rates should be lower. If there is a disparity between officers’ decision to search certain racial or ethnic groups, then yield rates should differ between these groups.

- RAND examined 463,169 vehicle stops and identified 8,166 requests for consent to a search. RAND found that both Black and Hispanic individuals were more likely to receive a request for consent to a search relative to white individuals, whereas Asian individuals and individuals of unknown or other race were less likely to receive a request for consent to a search than white individuals (RAND p. 80).

- Although there were differences in the likelihood of certain groups being requested to consent to a search, the odds that a given search found contraband were relatively consistent across White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian individuals (RAND, p. 82).

- RAND was also asked to examine whether certain racial or ethnic groups are more or less likely to consent to a search when it is requested. However, there was not sufficient data to answer this question (RAND p. 81).
SIGNIFICANT TAKE-AWAYS: OFFICER-CIVILIAN CONTACTS

Individual Officer Analysis

This analysis focused on actions of individual officers compared to their peers. This is helpful in identifying officers who may be acting disproportionately towards one racial/ethnic group and/or have a higher frequency of certain policing outcomes (e.g., more arrests for speeding stops). RAND conducted a series of tests to understand the extent to which:

- Analysis 1: Officers stop a driver of a specific racial group disproportionately.
  - For example: When controlling for officer shift, beat, years of service, and other factors, does a certain officer stop more Black drivers than their peers?

- Analysis 2: Certain officer characteristics are associated with specific policing outcomes.
  - For example: Are male officers more likely to make arrests for speeding than female officers?

SIGNIFICANT TAKE-AWAYS: ANALYSIS 1

RAND analyzed the six-year historical data set to identify officers who stop individuals of a certain race/ethnicity more often than their peer group. It is important to note, that while RAND controlled for many officer characteristics (race/ethnicity, age, sex, years of service, shift, patrol area/beat, time of day, and day of stop), they did not account for officers’ roles (e.g., Traffic Safety Officer, Crime Reduction Officer, etc.). CMPD will continue to finetune this model as an important indicator of officer behavior, including adding additional variables to reduce false positive. For example, some of the outliers identified in the RAND analysis were officers who serve in the Traffic Safety/Transportation Unit, which by design performs more traffic stops and is deployed across a much larger geographic scope than the typical Patrol Unit. Other officer roles that significantly impact traffic stop patterns involve officers serving in patrol division Crime Reduction Units. This analysis and methodology used by RAND will become an internal metric and another tool, in addition to the existing Early Intervention System, to identify and address officers who may be exhibiting disproportionality in their actions. The following table provides information on:

- Low outliers – Officers who stop individuals of a given race/ethnicity less frequently than their peer group.
- Average – Officers whose behavior falls within the norm compared to a group of their peers.
- High outliers – Officers who stop individuals of a given race/ethnicity more frequently than their peer group.

It is possible for an officer to be an outlier towards one racial/ethnic group and rank average for another racial/ethnic group. Because not every officer stops an individual of every race, 882 officers make up the “average” officer group over the course of the study period (RAND, p. 99).
**Individual Officer Analysis**

**Outliers**

*(Out of 900 Officers)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driver Race</th>
<th>Number of officers that stopped more frequently than their peers</th>
<th>Number of officers that stopped less frequently than their peers</th>
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<td>White</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant take-aways: Analysis 2**

RAND's final analysis evaluated the relationship between specific officer characteristics (experience, age, gender, and race) and policing outcomes such as stops, arrests, and complaints. The following graphics some findings from this analysis (RAND, pp. 100-102).

**Individual Officer Analysis**

Given that a complaint took place, compared to...

- **White officers**: Black officers are less likely to receive a complaint about an arrest, search or seizure.
- **Female officers**: Male officers are more likely to receive a complaint about an arrest, search or seizure and use of force.
- **Officers with less experience**: Officers with more experience are less likely to receive a complaint about use of force.
Review of CMPD Policies and Strategies

Given the evidence of statistically significant racial disparities identified in certain types of analysis, RAND reviewed CMPD’s current directives to understand if any policies or strategies may be driving these results. RAND was not able to identify specific policies or strategies that were causing the racial disparities observed in the data, and commends CMPD’s policy directives and data transparency, specifically CMPD’s:

- “Choke Hold” policy, which is consistent with standards from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, implemented on January 1, 1987; CMPD Directive 600-019.

- Recognition of the sanctity of life, consistent with the Police Executive Research Forum’s first guiding principle on use of force; CMPD Directive 600-019.

- Establishment of a policy that explicitly dictates that officers will not use arbitrary stereotypes to influence stops, searches, or initiation of policing activity, and will not make assumptions about an individual’s immigration status; CMPD Directive 600-017.

- Publishing of all CMPD directives online.

- Managing of a web portal for submitting complaints and commendations.

- Publishing of traffic stops and officer involved shootings on a publicly available portal (RAND, pp 102-103).
**Recommendations and Next Steps**

- Improve and enhance the data that is collected in the Internal Affairs Case Management System (IACMS) and augment data fields to capture more contextual data about officer-resident contacts including address validation and automated geocoding.

- Enable linkages between IACMS and other data sets, mainly calls for service, traffic stops, and arrests/charges, to provide a more holistic view of officer-resident interactions.

- Add data validation checks to the Traffic Stop Data Collection system.

- Conduct further analysis into findings that warrant more understanding and use this analysis to develop next steps. For example:
  - Analysis of use of Force at Traffic Stops – Incorporate more contextual details of officer-community member interactions to more precisely detect if disparities exist.
  - Individual Officer Analysis – Account for the type of officer role in the analysis.

- CMPD will launch a Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) comprised of civilian roles to proactively research, review, and update CMPD policies, directives, and plans as needed.

- Continue to refine the model used in the Individual Officer Analysis to reduce false positives and improve the accuracy of the model and establish an outlier review process within CMPD’s Professional Accountability Bureau.

- Improve CMPD’s Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies reporting for a more holistic view of use of force, including the race/ethnicity of civilians involved and more context on the circumstances preceding uses of force.
Recommendation 5

Engage a university or independent organization to evaluate selected youth programs on an annual basis.

The University of North Carolina at Charlotte’s (UNC Charlotte) Urban Institute oversaw the research and analysis associated with Recommendation 5. This research was primarily conducted by ROI Impact Consulting, with the assistance of students and researchers from UNC Charlotte and guidance of faculty from UNC Charlotte and Johnson C. Smith University.

UNC Charlotte was asked to organize the goals, objectives, and outcomes of CMPD’s youth-serving programs into an Impact Framework, which is a set of guiding principles around which the programs should be implemented. They were also asked to assess the current implementation of these programs against the goals and outcomes of the Impact Framework; identify gaps in CMPD’s ability to measure programs’ outcomes; recommend specific ways CMPD can improve programs’ assessment capabilities; and provide an ongoing plan for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the impact of CMPD’s programs.

UNC Charlotte began with an inquiry into the 29 programs described in the CMPD Community Services Bureau’s “Community Programs Overview” report. Of this group of 29 programs, six were removed from the study because they are not primarily funded or administered by CMPD. Two others – the Cops Care Curriculum and Latinx Initiative – were also removed, as they are components of multiple other programs rather than individual, standalone programs. The remaining 21 programs were grouped based on similar goals, objectives, and outcomes. These 21 programs were organized into five categories:

- Law Enforcement Career Pipeline;
- Community Relationships and Perception;
- Public Safety – Youth Development and Academic/Career Success;
- Public Safety – Gang, Violence, and Conflict Prevention; and
- Public Safety – Youth Diversion.

Two Impact Frameworks were designed for each category of programs—an “evidence-based” framework which describes best practices identified in a literature review conducted by UNC Charlotte researchers, and a “program-based” framework which describes programs’ current practices identified in a series of interviews and workshops with CMPD program administrators and partner organizations. Gaps between these two frameworks were identified as potential areas of improvement for programs.

UNC Charlotte also assessed the data currently collected across CMPD’s youth-serving programs, the capacity of CMPD’s program administrators, and the evidence-base for each individual program to determine programs’ evaluability. Based on these findings, UNC Charlotte recommended strategies for improving CMPD’s ability to evaluate programs.
Key Findings

• CMPD currently implements five evidence-based strategies across all impact categories:
  
  o Educate youth about CMPD policies, personal rights, and responsibilities.
  
  o Create opportunities to forge positive extended relationships with officers and mentors.
  
  o Build and maintain a network of relationships with community partners to augment program resources for youth and their families.
  
  o Create a continuum of progressive, interconnected, and scaffolding program experiences.
  
  o Expose youth to new experiences and opportunities such as college and career planning.

• CMPD's coordinated cross-referral of program participants has been successful.

• Of the 21 programs examined, 11 are evidence-based and could be evaluable with improved data collection, four are partially evidence-based and are potentially evaluable with changes to implementation practices, and six are not evidence-based or evaluable.
  
  o One program—Youth Diversion—currently collects enough data to be evaluable. The Youth Diversion program routinely reports data-based outcomes and has been evaluated previously.
  
  o All six of the unevaluable programs fall into the category “Community Relationships and Perceptions”.

• CMPD program administrators do not have the capacity or training to design or implement a robust program evaluation process.

• CMPD lacks the technological infrastructure and staff capacity to collect and share data consistently across programs.
Recommendations

- Invest in staff and technology to support program evaluation.
  - Explore internal data and analytic resources that could be used to support data collection and evaluation (e.g., the City of Charlotte Innovation & Technology Department) as well as external resources with existing expertise (e.g., academic institutions).
  - Consider adding civilian program coordinators or case managers to provide administrative and evaluation support to CMPD’s program administrators.

- Implement practices to address the identified gaps between “evidence-based” and “program-based” impact frameworks. Examples of common gaps include:
  - Ensuring equitable access to programs by using screening, assessment, and eligibility tools.
  - Targeting resources to the youth who are at the highest risk.
  - Involving peer leaders to recruit youth and facilitate programming.

- Consider scaling CMPD programs in high-need areas.

- Prioritize building evaluation capacity in the Youth Diversion program, Reach Out, Envision Academy, REACH Academy, and Career Pipeline programs, as these programs are most aligned with best practices and currently collect some data relevant to program evaluation.

Next Steps

- Explore the addition of civilian positions to support youth programs through existing CMPD civilianization efforts.

- Collaboration between CMPD and the I&T Data and Analytics to prioritize programs for enhancements and identify specific metrics associated with each program’s goals and objectives.
Recommendation 6 (Training)

Enhance recruitment efforts and develop a program to provide additional residency incentives to officers living in priority areas, including a down payment incentive.

The city built on Recommendation 6’s examination of officer recruitment with an analysis of the training patrol officers receive throughout their careers. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) evaluated the curriculum and impact of training administered to new recruits, lateral transfers, and intermediate recruits at the Police Academy, as well as the in-service training all officers receive each year.

IACP began this research with job-task analysis of patrol officer duties and responsibilities. In an online survey, 611 patrol officers were asked to identify the frequency with which they perform a list of more than 1,200 tasks related to law enforcement, and 123 officer supervisors were asked to identify the criticality of these tasks and when officers should be expected to learn them. IACP used the results of these surveys to identify the most critical tasks that officers perform. A Project Advisory Committee consisting of patrol supervisors reviewed the task list used in the survey for completeness, clarity, and relevance. This Committee also reviewed the results of the job-task analysis and advised IACP on the criticality of tasks for which the survey produced inconclusive results.

IACP compared the results of this job-task analysis to the curricula, training objectives, and teaching materials used in new recruit, lateral transfer, intermediate recruit, and in-service training. This review did not include elective or advanced courses. Of the 971 hours of instruction required for new recruits, 640 are mandated under North Carolina’s Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET) Standards. The North Carolina Justice Academy provides standardized instructional materials and curricula for these courses. CMPD Training Academy staff create all instructional materials for the other 331 hours of training taught at the academy, as well as some of the in-service training required of officers each year. IACP analyzed both the rigor of materials supporting individual CMPD-developed courses and the overall curriculum development process at the academy. In comparing training materials to the critical tasks identified in the job-task analysis, IACP sought to determine potential training gaps and opportunities for improvement. IACP also reviewed the organizational structure and staffing of the academy.

Key Findings

- CMPD does a commendable job of delivering state-mandated BLET coursework.
  - North Carolina’s BLET is one of the nation’s top curriculums and is backed by a state-wide job-task analysis, which drives curriculum development.

- There is insufficient internal agency data to support the need for all 331 hours of additional CMPD-specific training provided to new recruits.
  - North Carolina’s 640 mandated hours of training adequately cover the 1,200+ tasks included in IACP’s job-task analysis.
The job-task analysis identified 93 critical tasks, which provides supporting data for some additional CMPD-specific training. The 15 most critical tasks identified in the job-task analysis were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 Most Critical Tasks Identified in the Job-Task Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Hold a person under investigative detention (i.e., Terry Stop)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Execute the stop of a motor vehicle and approach and talk to the operator and passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Intercede in domestic disputes to resolve, maintain peace, and protect persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Restrain unruly or violent individuals, remove them from public areas, and arrest if necessary</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Serve as a back-up officer at a scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Conduct a preliminary investigation, and be the first responder to, various felony and/or misdemeanor crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Make an arrest without warrant at a scene of domestic violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Recognize laws and limits on law enforcement powers when crossing jurisdictional lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Activate emergency equipment and direct a violator’s vehicle out of moving traffic to execute an unknown-risk stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Conduct a high-risk vehicle stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Use deflation devices (e.g., stop stick, etc.) to slow a vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Respond to a crime-in-progress call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Describe persons to other officers (e.g., suspects, missing persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Conduct a search of persons entering a public facility or room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Watch occupants of a stopped vehicle to identify unusual or suspicious actions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- CMPD-specific supplementary courses lack defined curricula, learning objectives, testing materials, or return-on-investment metrics.

- CMPD-developed in-service training is often reactionary and developed in response to specific local or national events.

- Staffing at the Training Academy has not substantively increased since 2004; the department has grown by more than 425 officers in that time.

- Training staff do not have the capacity or expertise to develop training materials.
Recommendations

- Implement a centralized process to aggregate and analyze officer performance data. Use this data to determine training needs and develop learning objectives for CMPD-specific training.

- Use the 93 critical tasks identified in the job-task analysis as a basis for determining in-service training needs.
  - Duty to intervene training was determined to be especially critical.

- Begin using return on investment metrics to quantify the overall value of CMPD-specific training and inform future changes to training priorities.

- Create a Training Advisory Committee comprised of staff from all facets of the department and community stakeholders to review relevant internal data and prioritize CMPD training needs.

- Conduct a staffing study for the Training Academy to compare CMPD responsibilities and training staff with those of similar-sized agencies.

- Employ at least one full-time civilian curriculum developer to support CMPD’s training staff.
  - Develop evidence-based, data-driven, and justifiable learning objectives and training materials for all CMPD-specific training courses.

Next Steps

- Create three civilian positions to support CMPD Training Academy staff – Curriculum Developer, Learning Development Manager, and Training Specialist.
  - As of September 2021, CMPD has hired the Training Specialist position.

- Review course-specific recommendations from IACP’s report and prioritize courses for enhancement.

- Research staffing models of training academies in similarly-sized police departments.

- Explore the development of a structured process for identifying and prioritizing future training needs, such as the creation of a Training Advisory Committee and the incorporation of officer performance data in decision-making.

- Develop a plan to strengthen “duty to intervene” training in in-service and new recruit curricula. CMPD implemented a strengthened duty to intervene policy in June of 2020 as part of the department’s work towards “8 Can’t Wait” initiative.
Recommendation 6 (Recruitment)

Enhance recruitment efforts and develop a program to provide additional residency incentives to officers living in priority areas, including a down payment incentive.

Efforts to Address this recommendation are currently underway. The city has partnered with BEWorks, a behavioral psychology firm to:

- Evaluate the city’s residency incentives for officers; and
- Analyze the city’s recruitment process from original solicitation through candidate selection, with consideration given to where and why potential candidates drop out and performance of different demographic groups.

Findings and recommendations are expected to be finalized in late fall 2021.

Moving Forward Together

The City of Charlotte has dedicated funding in FY 2022 to keep the momentum going and to continue developing these key recommendations toward reimagining policing in Charlotte.

- Provide $1.2 million to launch mental health civilian response;
- Support $1 million to continue SAFE Charlotte Grant;
- Commit $739,000 to double the number of Community Policing Crisis Response Teams; and
- Dedicate $250,000 to support Social Justice Data Initiative with UNC Charlotte.

The city and its partners will work to advance the next steps outlined in this report as part of an on-going effort to evaluate, evolve, and maintain the safety of our residents.
To Learn More:
CharlotteNC.gov/SAFECharlotte